Should we control? The interplay between cognitive control and information integration in the resolution of the exploration-exploitation dilemma

In their daily decisions, humans and animals are often confronted with the conflicting choice of opting either for a rewarding familiar option (i.e., exploitation) or for a novel, uncertain option that may, however, yield a better reward in the near future (i.e., exploration). Despite extensive research, the cognitive mechanisms that subtend the manner in which humans solve this exploration-exploitation dilemma are still poorly understood. In this study, we challenge the popular assumption that exploitation is a global default strategy that must be suppressed by means of cognitive control mechanisms so as to enable exploratory strategies. To do so, we asked participants to engage in a challenging working memory task while performing repeated choices in a gambling task. Results showed that manipulating cognitive control resources exclusively hindered participants’ ability to explore the environment in a directed, intentional manner. Moreover, under certain scenarios, adopting exploitative strategies was also dependent on the availability of cognitive control resources. Additional analyses using a recent computational model of information integration suggests that increasing cognitive load specifically interferes with the ability to combine reward and information in order to inform choices. Our results shed light on the cognitive mechanisms that underpin the resolution of the dilemma and provide a formal foundation through which to explore pathologies of goal-directed behavior

The Sense of Agency as Tracking Control

Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N1 amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent. We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real-time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone

Distinct motivations to seek out information in healthy individuals and problem gamblers

As massive amounts of information are becoming available to people, understanding the mechanisms underlying information-seeking is more pertinent today than ever. In this study, we investigate the underlying motivations to seek out information in healthy and addicted individuals. We developed a novel decision-making task and a novel computational model which allows dissociating the relative contribution of two motivating factors to seek out information: a desire for novelty and a general desire for knowledge. To investigate whether/how the motivations to seek out information vary between healthy and addicted individuals, in addition to healthy controls we included a sample of individuals with gambling disorder—a form of addiction without the confound of substance consumption and characterized by compulsive gambling. Our results indicate that healthy subjects and problem gamblers adopt distinct information-seeking “modes”. Healthy information-seeking behavior was mostly motivated by a desire for novelty. Problem gamblers, on the contrary, displayed reduced novelty-seeking and an increased desire for accumulating knowledge compared to healthy controls. Our findings not only shed new light on the motivations driving healthy and addicted individuals to seek out information, but they also have important implications for the treatment and diagnosis of behavioral addiction

The power of suggestion: post-hypnotically induced changes in the temporal binding of intentional action outcomes

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception

Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: testing predictions with trait individual differences

We investigated differences in intentional binding in high and low hypnotizable groups to explore two questions relating to (a) trait differences in the availability of motor intentions to metacognitive processes and (b) a proposed cue combination model of binding. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding and may arise from strategically being unaware of one’s intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions. Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward a causal action (outcome binding). Intentional binding is sensitive to intentional action without requiring explicit reflection upon agency. One way of explaining the sensitivity of intentional binding is to see it as a simple case of multisensory cue combination in which awareness of intentions increases knowledge of the timing of actions. Here we present results consistent with such a mechanism. In a contingent presentation of action and outcome events, low hypnotizable had more precise timing judgments of actions and also showed weaker action binding than highs. These results support the theory that trait hypnotizability is related to access to information related to motor intentions, and that intentional binding reflects the Bayesian combination of cross-modal cues

Higher-order thoughts in action : Consciousness as an unconscious re-description process

Peer reviewedPostprin

Rapidly Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning: Amnesics Learn Quickly and Happy People Slowly

BACKGROUND We introduce a method for quickly determining the rate of implicit learning. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS The task involves making a binary prediction for a probabilistic sequence over 10 minutes; from this it is possible to determine the influence of events of a different number of trials in the past on the current decision. This profile directly reflects the learning rate parameter of a large class of learning algorithms including the delta and Rescorla-Wagner rules. To illustrate the use of the method, we compare a person with amnesia with normal controls and we compare people with induced happy and sad moods. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Learning on the task is likely both associative and implicit. We argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that both amnesia and also transient negative moods can be associated with an especially large learning rate: People with amnesia can learn quickly and happy people slowl

The Validity of d′ Measures

Subliminal perception occurs when prime stimuli that participants claim not to be aware of nevertheless influence subsequent processing of a target. This claim, however, critically depends on correct methods to assess prime awareness. Typically, d′ (“d prime”) tasks administered after a priming task are used to establish that people are unable to discriminate between different primes. Here, we show that such d′ tasks are influenced by the nature of the target, by attentional factors, and by the delay between stimulus presentation and response. Our results suggest that the standard d′ task is not a straightforward measure of prime visibility. We discuss the implications of our findings for subliminal perception research